

To members of the Penn-Temple European Studies Colloquium:

As you read our paper “Political Representation and EU Accession: Evidence from Poland”, please know that we are of course interested in feedback on all aspects of the paper. However, I also wanted to draw your attention to the fact that we are now considering splitting this paper into two separate papers. My concern is that there is currently too much going on in the paper, and that we could do a better job of presenting the materials if we essentially split the second and third empirical sections out into separate papers. I just wanted to flag this point for you before the seminar because I am very interested in whether you think splitting this paper in two is a good idea or not. Put another way, if you think we can go ahead and publish the current paper in largely the form it is now, that would be very useful information!

To give you a little more detail, the next two paragraphs provide a very brief overview of what I think these two new papers would look like if we followed this strategy. I do so with the important caveat that I’m not sure either description will be clear before you’ve read the current version of the paper.

The first new paper would focus more directly on the topic of the emergence of new parties, asking the question of whether euroskepticism in Poland created a “demand” for more euroskeptic parties, and in this way helped facilitate the emergence of both Samoobrona and the League of Polish families. This paper would build off of the section “Political Representation and the Polish Party System: The Emergence of Polish Euroskeptic Parties” in the current paper. We would also add a qualitative section of the role of Euroskepticism in the 2001 election campaign, as well as a number of new empirical tests (which I am happy to discuss at the seminar).

The second new paper would then be framed around the question of whether proximity to one’s elected representatives on crucial issue areas matters at all in terms of voting behavior, satisfaction with parties, and overall satisfaction with democracy. This paper would primarily build off of the section of the current paper entitled “Effects of Political Representation”, but would spend more time examining the question of which form proximity measure produces the best “fit” (e.g., minimizes the distance between citizens and their preferred parties) in the Polish context; it would also expand the empirical analysis contained in the current paper to weight proximity on issues by the salience of each issue to each individual voter (again, I am happy to expand on these plans in the current seminar).

Thanks very much ahead of time for your comments and suggestions, and I look forward to seeing you on Friday.

Best,  
Joshua Tucker

# Political Representation and EU Accession: Evidence from Poland

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## **Abstract**

In our paper, we ask three questions regarding political representation in Poland on the issue of EU membership. First, how important was this issue to both masses and elites? Second, did Polish political parties react in any way to mass political attitudes towards EU membership? Finally, did representation on the topic of EU membership have an effect on how Polish citizens voted, how they viewed political parties, or their overall assessment of the quality of Polish democracy? We address these questions in an effort to expand our understanding of the relevance of EU membership to Poland's domestic politics beyond the question of why certain citizens support EU membership, and in an effort to expand the study of political representation outside the confines of stable established democracies. We answer these questions using the 1997 and 2001 Polish National Election Studies, which surveyed both masses and parliamentary elites. Overall, we conclude that political representation on the issue of EU membership did matter to Polish citizens by helping inform their political choices and attitudes, and that political parties clearly seemed to have been aware of this fact and reacted to it. Although we note that this bodes well for the development of political representation in Poland, ironically it may ultimately prove threatening to the quality of democratic development by providing mass support for radical and anti-systemic parties.

## Introduction

The reaction of citizens in post-communist countries to potential membership in the European Union poses a striking paradox. On the one hand, joining the European Union is likely to have the most significant effect upon the evolution of their countries' political and economic development since the collapse of communism. On the other hand, the received wisdom would have us believe that EU related issues are much less important in the minds of citizens than just about any other issue of domestic politics. Such conclusions are backed up by years of research on the issue in Western Europe, where the near universal consensus is that EU issues are almost always of a second order concern to citizens (with perhaps the recent EU constitutional referenda as a notable exception) (Reif 1980; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Steunenberg and Thomassen 2002). Turnout in EU parliamentary elections in the West has always lagged behind turnout in national elections, and the first round of EU parliamentary elections in the newest states of the EU in 2004 did nothing to change this pattern.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, for all the knowledge we now have of the evolution of public opinion towards EU membership in post-communist countries and the vote in the EU Referenda on membership, we know surprisingly little at this point about how important the issue of representation on the issue of EU membership was for the development on domestic politics in post-communist countries in the years leading up to accession. This is a result of two important trends in the literature. First, almost all of the scholarly work on EU accession in post-communist countries has focused either on the details of elite level negotiations regarding the terms of membership (add citations) or on the question of ascertaining how much mass support for EU membership existed at different points in time and how the supporters differed from the

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<sup>1</sup> See for example Adshead and Hill 2005; for turnout figures, see [http://www.elections2004.eu.int/ep-election/sites/en/results1306/turnout\\_ep/index.html](http://www.elections2004.eu.int/ep-election/sites/en/results1306/turnout_ep/index.html).

opponents.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, the scholarship on political representation has almost exclusively involved empirical analyses of stable, established democracies (Miller and Stokes 1963; Barnes 1977; Dalton 1985; Converse and Pierce 1986; Powell 1989). Consequently, we have little knowledge to date of how representation on the issue of EU membership developed in the new member states, or what effect this representation may or may not have had.

The goal of this paper is to begin to fill gaps in both of these literature by providing a thorough assessments of the effects of representation on the issue of EU membership in Poland. We focus on a more in depth analysis of one country as opposed to a comparative analysis of multiple countries as an appropriate strategy for an article length initial exploration of the topic. We feature Poland as opposed to any of the other new member states for three reasons. First, with over 38 million citizens, Poles alone represent over half of the new members of the European Union and far more than any other single country.<sup>3</sup> Second, the stylized facts of the Polish case make it a particularly appropriate case for testing the effects of political representation on the political party system. The 1997-2001 Polish parliament featured no explicitly Euroskeptic political parties, and the 2001 parliamentary elections led to a major shake-up of the Polish party system. Of the six political parties in the previous parliament, only two made it in to the new parliament. Concurrently, four new parties gained seats for the first time in the parliament, two of which were explicitly Euroskeptic. Finally, the Polish National Election Studies (PNES) for both the 1997 and 2001 Polish parliamentary elections were

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<sup>2</sup> For more comparative studies, see Cichowski 2000; Tucker et al. 2002; Doyle and Fidrmuc 2003; Tverdova and Anderson 2004;. For studies of Poland in particular, see McManus- Czubińska et al. 2004; Szczerbiak 2001; Lewis 2002; Bielasiak 2002; Markowski and Tucker 2005.

<sup>3</sup> See McManus- Czubińska et al. 2004 for a similar justification for studying Poland.

explicitly designed to facilitate measurement of political representation, including both representative mass surveys and elite-level surveys of members of parliaments.<sup>4</sup>

The substantive focus of our analysis is motivated by the literature on political representation, which we discuss in the following section.<sup>5</sup> We attempt to answer the basic questions at the heart of this literature: did representation on the topic of EU membership have an effect on how Polish citizens voted, how they viewed political parties, or their overall assessment of the quality of Polish democracy?

Since there is so little known on the topic, we begin by assessing the salience of EU membership as an issue in comparative perspective with other issues. Contrary to the received wisdom, we find that in 1997, EU membership was actually one of the most important issues for Poles, although its salience declined by the time of the 2001 parliamentary election. Next, we examine the effect of political representation on the development of the Polish party system by assessing the degree of Euroskepticism among the electorate of Poland's two new populist-radical parties that competed in the 2001 elections, the League of Polish Families (LPR) and Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP), which together captured almost one-fifth of the 2001 vote. Across numerous tests, we find evidence that the electorates of these two parties were more Euroskeptic than either supporters of other parties or non-voters, leading us to suspect that the fact that these parties provided an avenue of political representation on the EU issue area to Euroskeptic voters contributed to their overall political success.

In the final section of the paper, we test the effects of political representation on the issue of EU membership in comparison with the effects of representation on other issues. In the spirit

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<sup>4</sup> Markowski served as the principal investigator and director of both the 1997 and 2001 Polish National Election Studies (in Polish, Polskie Generalne Studium Wyborcze, or PGSW: add web sight when ready).

<sup>5</sup> For more on the general topic of political representation, see for example Pitkin 1967; Barnes 1977; Fenno 1977; Eulau and Wahlkie 1978; Converse, Pierce 1986; Holmberg 1989; Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge 1994; Essaiason and Holmberg 1996.

of Easton (1956, 1965), we examine both diffuse effects of representation, on the overall level of satisfaction with democracy, and more specific effects, on both party preference and intensity of party preference. The findings are fairly striking and somewhat surprising: to the extent that Poles are influenced by proximity to a party on any of these issue areas, proximity to parties in terms of attitudes towards EU membership is clearly one of the most important. This is certainly the case in terms of satisfaction with democracy and party preference, although it is not as strong for intensity of party preference. This leads us to conclude that although EU membership was obviously not the foremost issue on the minds of Poles leading at the time of the 2001 election, there was something fundamental about this issue that helped structure politics.

**Political representation: theoretical orthodoxy, innovations and empirical accounts.**

Among the many traditions and empirical approaches to the study of political representation one is certainly still underdeveloped: the issue of *making of representation(s)* – a dynamic process by which representatives and represented are defined, create the space and content of representation and interact with each other. It is precisely to this subfield of the representation that we hope to contribute. While we do not have access to classical panel data (which would best serve the purpose), we do have rich empirical longitudinal surveys with which some of the ideas we have can be plausibly tested.

Since the paper is not aimed at testing particular ways in which political representation has been conceptualized and operationalized, we will not discuss all problems pertinent to the topic. We have however consciously selected several ideas and approaches to scrutinizing political representation. To begin, the distinction, offered first by Hannah Pitkin, on the difference between “standing for” and “acting for” representation is of crucial importance to us.

Holmberg (1989) builds on this point by suggesting one should be aware of (at least) four roles of representation.<sup>6</sup> The first two, “social” and “role” representation, are more or less copies of Pitkin’s distinction. However, when discussing the idea of “acting for” representation Holmberg raises the question of the importance of the “will” on the side of the representative (an issue reflected upon earlier by Converse and Pierce [1986]) and the “focus” of representation (an issue debated two centuries earlier by Edmund Burke). Holmberg adds to the Burkean dilemma about whether a representative ought to represent local or all-national interests another three possible sources of representation: party interests, pressure group interests, and individual interests. The other two representative roles discussed by Holmberg are “policy representation” and “anticipatory representation”. The first concentrates on the fit between policy preferences between the elite and the masses, by comparing issue opinions but not actions. “Policy representation” should be distinguished from *acting for* representation in that it need not involve the will to represent. “Policy representation” can be unintentional; Converse and Pierce refer to this as a type of *malgre lui* representation. Finally, it is worth distinguishing “anticipatory representation” – a phenomenon that is based on the will of the representatives to make sure they know what the people they are representing want them to do. This idea is closely related to the Burkean mandate-delegate mode of representation, more recently expanded upon in Manin, Przeworski and Stokes (1999). In what follows we will concentrate mainly on the “policy representation” approach when it comes to the empirical testing of data. We do however pay attention and contextualize our finding by referring to the concepts of “anticipatory” and “role” representation.

What needs to be emphasized at this point is that since we are studying the Polish case - a classical parliamentary democracy, based on PR electoral rules - we design our analyses on the

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<sup>6</sup> For a different earlier proposal, see Eulau and Wahlkie (1978).



so-called *Responsible Party Model* (RPM), which is different from the model developed by Miller-Stokes (1963) and other typical “representative diamond” relationships, which concentrate mostly on the mandate-independence controversy. The fundamental assumptions of the RPM are based on the premise that on both sides of the “representational bond” we find collective, not individual, entities. On the represented side, this is the electorate, spread all over the country, though geographically constrained. On the side of those who are elected to represent the electorate is the collective entity called a party, and, more specifically, the parliamentary caucus of party members who won seats. The fundamental assumptions of the model can be summarized as follows: (a) the crucial actors of representation are parties, not individual politicians, and politicians are constrained by the party organization; (b) parties compete by offering programmatic alternatives; (c) policy programs are publicized, are known to voters and the opinion-formation process runs top-down; (d) voters compare programmatic packages parties offer and vote for the ones that fall most proximate to their preferences, as it is envisaged that programs are specific “deals”.

For these reasons we adopt – though in a simpler form – Achen’s concept of “proximity” as a proxy for representation (Achen 1978). Achen argues that proximity directly taps into the democratic ideal of “citizens equality”, or the presumption that everyone’s voice should count equally. Achen also highlights “popular sovereignty”, or the idea that what people decide must influence political outcomes, as another ideal of democracy, and he identifies responsiveness as a key tool towards assessing its presence or absence. While we are primarily focused on proximity in this paper, we make some preliminary attempts at assessing responsiveness in the Polish case in our longitudinal analyses, where one of our main questions is whether politicians are responsive to their electorates or/and whether the parties are able to socialize their voters to

follow their policy proposals. Recently, several studies have been devoted to the top-down mechanisms of political representation (Essaion and Holmberg 1996; Holmberg 1997), partly derived from the old observation that pure political demands by “the people” are usually vague, divergent and incomprehensible in policy terms.

From the previous discussion, it is clear that the quality of representation depends heavily on the deeds of the representative side. Do politicians have the will to represent? Do they have preferences similar to their electorates? Do they have the capacity to accurately unveil the real preferences of their voters? But the issue is even more complicated than that, as the quality of representation is also a function of the electorates’ homo/heterogeneity. If a geographically or socially defined electorate is highly divergent on an issue, there is little a willing-acting-for-and-standing-for and especially accurately-perceiving-representative can do about it. It might not be an acute problem in a *Majority Control* vision of representation (Huber and Powell 1994), where – among other assumptions – representatives are expected to implement policies that fit the majority’s expectations, but it certainly creates a problem in a *Proportional Influence* vision, which aims at representing all citizens. Whether it is normatively desirable or not, the ability of the representatives to do their job properly is a monotonically dependent function of district heterogeneity. Achen also identifies this problem is highlighting a third ideal of liberal democracy as “neutrality towards alternatives”, or the concept of fairness about the performance of those who were delegated to represent. In Achen’s view, this is a measure of the ability of the representative entity to locate itself “efficiently” so that there is no other position it can take that would represent more of its constituents, regardless of the particular electorate’s heterogeneity (see p.487).

The issue of the electorates' cohesion versus diffuseness is even more complicated by the fact that policy preferences and issue stances are both objective phenomena, which have their subjective perception correlates. Human capacity to correctly perceive the reality has been debated for centuries, and countless examples of inaccurate evaluations of social reality can be found. For these reasons it is always worth to control for both objective indicators and peoples perceptions. In what follows we take note of these ideas and control for objective and subjective visions of reality.

### **Salience of EU Issue Area**

We begin with question of whether EU membership was and is considered an important issue for Poles. We do so largely to establish that it is in fact a legitimate topic for the study of political representation; if Poles were completely uninterested in the issue, then it would be questionable whether it even made sense to analyze political representation on the topic of EU membership. But we also do so to situate our study in a more dynamic framework by comparing data from the 1997 and 2001 Polish NES.

-- INSTERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE --

Several detailed conclusions can be drawn from comparing the 1997 and 2001 opinions of Poles concerning the salience of EU membership for Poland. First, we clearly see that the issue has become less salient in 2001 than it was four years earlier; the difference is significant – on an eleven point scale more that 1.2 scale-points (from 7.19 down to 5.96, see Table 1). In comparison with nine other issues (not listed in the tables, but see Table 3 for issues), the EU

issue in 1997 is ranked right in the middle of the ten issues in terms of importance.<sup>7</sup> Second, at both points in time voters attach slightly more importance to the issue than non-voters. Third, the difference between electorates in 2001 is notably larger than in 1997. Fourth, not only is the difference between electorates larger, but the intra-electorates cohesion is also considerably lower than in 1997 (see the standard deviations in Table 2). Finally, the two Eurosceptic parties, LPR and SRP, together with the old peasant party, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), scored lowest in terms of the salience of the issue.

From these distributions two broad conclusions are justified: (i) the closer Poles came to voting on EU membership, the less importance Poles attached to this event; and (ii) the closer Poles came to EU entry, the more differentiated the electorates of each party became on how to assess the importance of this event. Moreover, the variation occurs both between parties' electorates as well as within them. Finally, despite this variation, individuals considering EU membership a less relevant issue than other issues support parties that are more eurosceptic.

Greater variance in the salience of EU membership is also visible when we look through a more sociological lens, i.e. checking these distributions by basic socio-demographic categories between group variation in 2001 is much higher than in 1997. In a nutshell the educated, more affluent, urban residents, and younger individuals consider the issue of EU membership to be more salient than other groups. At the same time, the between group difference increases from 1997-2001, as does the within group variance.<sup>8</sup>

Since this paper is concerned with political representation, we also need to uncover the elite stances on the matter. Briefly, most of the details sketched for the voters do not apply to

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<sup>7</sup> All ten issues were carefully selected on the basis of their salience among Polish publics. The exact wording of this question is in the Appendix. At this point let us only mention that the structure of the question expect the respondent to assess the salience of the issue compared to all other on the list.

<sup>8</sup> Tables omitted out of concern for space, but are available from the authors upon request.

Polish parliamentary elites. First of all, the issue is much more important for elites than for the citizens, not only in absolute terms (on the same 11-point scale as the one used in the mass survey), but also in relative terms. The post-1997<sup>9</sup> parliamentary elites ranked the EU issue<sup>10</sup> third from the top, after "law and order/crime" and "social safety net". And in 2001, the elites ranked EU membership second from the top, after only the issue of unemployment. In absolute location on the scale the EU issues has remained almost constant, in the first point in time it was – on average, by all MPs – located at 8.1 and four years later at 8.2 of the 0-to-10 scale.

Finally, MPs of the euroskeptical parties look very different both from one another and from the other parties. The LPR parliamentary caucus members rank the salience of the EU issue very high – at point 8.0 on average, but have an extraordinary high internal lack of cohesion (standard deviation of 4.05). The SRP caucus members are at the other extreme, ranking the EU-issue at its lowest, at 3.8 on average, with still very high internal differentiation (standard deviation of 3.44).

-- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE --

What should we make of this decrease in salience of the EU issue area between 1997 and 2001? In Table 3, we compare the correlation between salience on the issue of EU membership with a respondent's position on EU membership; the tables also report on this relationship for the other nine issue areas. A negative correlation reveals that people who consider the issue important are more likely to think that EU membership is desirable (0) as opposed to something to be avoided (10). Two findings are apparent. First, in both 1997 and 2001, there is a high

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<sup>9</sup> The elite surveys, at both points in time, were "in the field" approximately half a year after the parliamentary election, which means they were conducted *de facto* in 1998 and 2002, but for the sake of clarity we will refer to them as elite surveys 1997 and 2001, as they are part of Polish National Election Study 1997 and 2001 projects.

<sup>10</sup> In the 1997 elite and mass surveys, respondents were asked about the importance of NATO and EU membership in a single question. At that time the two issues were almost always publicly debated together and there were very few ideas voiced that they ought to be discussed separately.

degree of correlation between believing that the issue of EU membership is an important issue, and in favoring EU membership for Poland. Thus a large proportion of the decrease in salience of the issue of EU membership between 1997 and 2001 can be attributed to increasing Euroskeptic views in the Polish populace; Euroskeptics were less likely to think the issue important than Euroenthusiasts. And indeed, the average position on EU membership also moved in the Euroskeptic direction, from a mean of 3.6 with a standard deviation of 3.2 to a mean of 5.1 with a standard deviation of 3.4. Second, this pattern is not nearly as strong in the other issue areas, especially in 2001. So there may be something distinctive to EU membership as an issue area that equates opposing EU membership with not thinking that EU membership is an important issue at all.

In this section, we have demonstrated the following four points: salience on the issue of EU membership dropped from 1997-2001 while both inter and intra-group variation increased; the issue was much more salient among elites in 2001 than among the masses; one's view of the salience of the EU issue was strongly linked to one's position on EU membership, and overall Poles became less supportive of EU membership. This suggests the following for the development of political representation in Poland on this issue. First, elites were – in the broadest sense – unsuccessful in persuading voters as to the importance of the EU issue area. Second, it would seem that LPR and SRP might face a greater challenge in the future in securing the loyalty of their voters on the basis of the EU issue area, in so far as those voters attach low salience to the issue. At the same time, with greater intra-group electorate variation in both salience and position, political party leaders – including those of LPR and SRP – might in the future have more room to maneuver on the EU issue.<sup>11</sup> Finally, the emergence of a Euroskeptic

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<sup>11</sup> Radek anecdote about what Giertych did the day after EU referendum, and the success of LPR in the 2004 EU parl election.

electorate could offer a potential reservoir of support for these same parties in 2001. It is to this topic that we turn in the following section.

### **Political Representation and the Polish Party System: The Emergence of Polish Euroskeptical Parties**

In addition to the decline in salience over the issue of EU membership and a wider range of opinions among Polish citizens on the subject, the 2001 elections also witnessed a major upheaval of the Polish party system. This included the disintegration of the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) coalition, which was formed in 1996 as an umbrella organization for the numerous rightist parties in Poland and swept to victory in 1997 parliamentary election. In the 2001 election, however, the remnants of AWS failed even to clear the 8% threshold necessary for coalitions to receive seats in the Polish parliament. However, prior to the election several new right-wing parties emerged in the wake of AWS's collapse, one of which was the League of Polish Families (LPR). The core of the new party came basically from what in mid-1990s was the Stronnictwo Narodowe (National Party) and a few other minor nationalist groupings; some of the politicians had also been members Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe (Christian-National Union). Their support came mainly from provincial areas, small and medium size localities, and rather poorly educated and less affluent people. The three most significant traits of LPR's electorate was overrepresentation among women, elderly, and devout Catholics, most of whom were listeners to Radio Maryja.<sup>12</sup>

From its inception until the time of the 2003 Polish Referendum on EU membership, the stance of LPR on the EU issue did not change: at the most basic level, it opposed the idea of

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<sup>12</sup> Radio Maryja is a Catholic-based radio station which espouses politically radical, xenophobic and nationalistic views. Its non-political programs, however, play an important role in targeting the needs of Poland's more marginalized populations, including especially the poor and uneducated.

joining the EU.<sup>13</sup> In most of their publications, posters and billboards, EU membership was presented as another occupation or partition of Poland by neighbors from the West. "Yesterday Moscow, today Brussels" or "Poland for Poles" were slogans used by LPR. One well known poster proclaimed: "Every Pole will have a job in EU, so lets go there. Every Pole will have a Mercedes... to wash.". In the eyes of the LPR, EU membership represented a danger commensurate to the 18<sup>th</sup> century partitions concerning all domains of life: economy, religious identity and land.

The main political appeal of the LPR can be labeled as Christian-nationalist right; it was an extreme – and at times anti-systemic – party. Their programmatic stances and elites' public message can also be dubbed as xenophobic populism, although compared to some of their sister parties in Central (Sladek's Republicans in the Czech Republic or Csurka's Life and Justice Party in Hungary) or Western Europe (Vlaams Blok in Belgium or Heider's party in Austria), the LPR seems somewhat more moderate in terms of both xenophobia and populism. It is important however to emphasize that their anti-EU stance was highly critical mostly because of socio-cultural and civilizational issues rather than purely economic ones. As is often the case with populist parties, they were also highly critical of incumbent Polish political elites. Consequently their anti-European outlook was of a fundamental nature – they rejected the very idea of EU integration as a threat to the "Polishness" of the nation, its fundamental cultural values, and essential elements of national identity.

SRP had been – as a trade union called “Samoobrona” – in place since 1992, and had contested a number of parliamentary election without any even rudimentary electoral success

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<sup>13</sup> Although eventually it would suggest support for the idea either of a “Europe of sovereign nations” or a “confederation of independent states”.



until 2001.<sup>14</sup> For most of the 1990s, a group of activists organized around Samoobrona's leader Andrzej Lepper became famous for their direct radical actions (road blockades, attacking public buildings, seizing grain transports, and the like). These activists were generally medium to large scale farmers who had attempted to take advantage of the transition to a market economy but had been unsuccessful in doing so; many had defaulted on loans. They blamed international conspiracies and liberals in general, and high interest rates at banks in particular, for their lot. The 2001 election was the first that Samoobrona, now Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (SRP), contested as a party. It can be labeled as a radical populist-left party, as it predominantly concentrates on economic and socio-economic issues. Its programmatic appeal is addressed to "the people" in general as opposed to elites. Their more detailed target group is the rural population and marginalized social groups as well as any outsiders that might be considered victims of the transformation. There is relatively little of religious or cultural elements in their programmatic stance, if it appears it serves as a corollary of economic considerations. It is strongly anti-elitist, anti-institutional, anti-procedural and de facto anti-democratic, in the sense attached to democracy in liberal representative democracies. Direct version of democracy and referenda are the tools preferred by their leadership.

SRP's unexpected success in 2001 was mainly brought about by the support of middle-aged small towns inhabitants. This electorate is also distinguished by a high overrepresentation of males and those of very low educational attainment; no other party had such disproportionate support from the lowest educational and social strata. Contrary to some researchers' and commentators' opinions, it SRP does appear to have been mainly supported by failed

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<sup>14</sup> Between the 1997 and 2001 parliamentary election, a law was enacted that prohibited all organizations other than political parties or citizens' committees from participating in elections. Thus the Self-Defense (Samoobrona) trade union reorganized as the Self-Defense for the Republic of Poland (SRP) political party.

entrepreneurs and the unsuccessful provincial middle classes, but instead more by the excluded, lost, and helpless.

SRP's EU campaign differed considerably from the one offered by LPR. Lepper has argued that his party is not fundamentally against EU entry, but simply rejects these particular terms of agreement as they stand; especially in economic, and more specifically, agricultural policy domains. The Polish foreign policy was accused of contributing to the country becoming a market for production surpluses of the West. The "liberal" elites were responsible for this predicament, which had contributed to the destruction of the Polish enterprises, fishery and agriculture. He claimed to be a "eurorealist", meaning that Poland should not be joining the EU at this point in time and should instead postpone membership until it was able to bargain better terms for accession.

One of the most interesting findings from the 2003 Polish referendum on EU membership was the strong link between voting behavior in the 2001 Polish parliamentary elections and the 2003 referendum. Voters who had supported SRP and LPR in the 2001 parliamentary election were much more likely to oppose EU membership than voters for pro-EU parties. Indeed, the effect of this one variable – vote choice in the previous parliamentary election – dwarfed the effect of all standard socio-demographic indicators on predicting the likelihood of voting for or against EU membership. (see *Gazeta Wyborcza* 2003; Markowski and Tucker 2005). For scholars of public opinion towards EU membership in Western Europe, such findings might not be particularly surprising, as there is a history of citizens taking cues on their position towards EU membership from their preferred party (Anderson 1998; Taggart 1998). In post-communist countries, however, parties have long been presumed to be weak and less influential on the attitudes of their supporters (Markowski 2002, Lewis 2000).

Attempting to sort out the direction of this effect – whether voters chose parties based on their stance on EU membership or whether voters chose parties based on other issues and then came to accept their party’s position on EU membership – can offer an important insight into the nature of political representation on the EU issue, and, more specifically, whether parties reacted to or shaped Polish Euroskepticism. If cues from these two political parties once they entered the parliament led their supporters to their Euroskepticism, then at the time of the 2001 election we should see little if any distinction in the degree of Euroskepticism among voters for SRP and LPR and voters for other parties (as well as non-voters). However, if we can see important distinctions in terms of Euroskepticism between voters for SRP and LPR as opposed to voters for other parties and non-voters, then we can conclude the opposite: that Euroskeptic voters were turning to the Euroskeptic SRP and LPR at the time of the 2001 parliamentary election. From the point of view of this paper, it suggests a very Downsian effect for the issue of representation on EU membership on the development of the Polish party system, or, put another way, a reaction by elites to the lack of representation offered to Euroskeptics in the previous parliament. With this segment of the population unrepresented by any of the current parties in the parliament, Downsian models would predict that new parties should emerge to take advantage of this unrepresented section of the electorate (Downs 1957). And indeed, this is exactly what our evidence suggests occurred.

In the remainder of this section, we demonstrate the following. First, the supporters of LPR and SRP were significantly more Euroskeptic across a number of different dimensions than voters for other parties or non-voters. Second, supporters of the other parties (besides the LPR and SRP) are *not* distinguishable from non-voters in terms of Euroskepticism. Both of these factors suggest that lack of representation on an important issue in the 1997-2001 parliament

may have played an important role in the success of LPR and SRP in the 2001 election. Thus ironically, the rise of two parties with less than sparkling democratic credentials may have demonstrated precisely that representative democracy is alive and well in Poland, at least to the extent that Downs predicts how democratic representation ought to function. We also demonstrate that not only did the LPR and SRP offer an outlet for Euroskeptic voters in the 2001 election, but that they may even have appealed to different types of Euroskeptic voters, thus increasing the degree of representation even further.

We begin with the most direct measure of depth of Euroskepticism at the time of the 2001 election, the 0-10 scale introduced in the previous section; recall that the higher the number, the more Euroskeptic the respondent.

-- INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE --

All three panels point to the same overall conclusions. First, voters for the two Euroskeptic parties in 2001 are indeed significantly more Euroskeptic than either voters for other parties in the election or non-voters. This conclusion holds both among the electorate at large (Panel 1) and, interestingly, among only Euroskeptics (Panel 2), who we define as those with a score of 6-10 on the EU issue position.<sup>15</sup> This is an important observation, because had it not been the case, we could imagine that the results in Panel 1 could be a function of just having fewer Euroenthusiasts in SRP and LPR than in the other parties. But the results in Panel 2 demonstrate that not only was the average SRP or LPR voter more Euroskeptic than supporters of other parties, but even among Euroskeptics, SRP and LPR attracted the more extreme Euroskeptics.

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<sup>15</sup> Later in this section we refer to Euroenthusiasts, who are defined as people who score between 0-4 on the EU position scale.

Second, when we compare the LPR and SRP, voters for the LPR were even more Euroskeptic than voters for the SRP. This too holds across both the entire electorate (6.8 vs.6.1) and among just the Euroskeptic portion of their electorate (9.3 vs. 8.9). Furthermore, four-fifths of the LPR Euroskeptics were hard core Euroskeptics, as compared to a still significant but not quite as large two-thirds of the SRP Euroskeptics (see Panel 3).<sup>16</sup>

-- INSERT TABLE 5 --

Table 5 compares the attitudes of Euroskeptics on 16 EU-related questions by the same categories as Table 4. These questions tap into a variety of different EU-related attitudes, including the effect of EU membership on various facets of Polish life, opinions of the EU and its leadership, one's own sense of national identity, and a few questions about NATO (as indicative of general attitudes towards the west).

Table 5 reveals a similar overall conclusion to Table 4. Simply put, in any instance when respondents from these four categories are distinguished in terms of their degree of "anti-EU attitudes" (e.g., less trust of the EU, belief that EU membership is bad for Poland), it is *always* the case it is either supporters of LPR, SRP, or both parties that have the more anti-EU views.<sup>17</sup> Conversely, it is *never* the case that either SRP or LPR have significantly more positive views of the EU than either non-voters or voters for the non-Euroskeptic parties.<sup>18</sup> Second, similarly to

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<sup>16</sup> Defining hard core Euroskeptics as those who provided either just a score of 10 or a score of 8-10 on the EU position question produces largely similar findings for LPR, although less of a distinction for SRP. When hard core is limited to 10, SRP looks more similar to LPR; when it is expanded to 8-10, SRP looks fairly similar to the Other and Non-Voter categories.

<sup>17</sup> We also calculated means across a question asking whether respondents had been more motivated by economic concerns or political and cultural concerns in choosing whether to support or oppose EU membership. We did not include this result in Table 5 because there was no obvious Euroskeptic direction to the question. However, it is interesting to note that overall, Euroskeptics leaned heavily in the economic direction (with a mean of 1.22 on the 1-2 scale, which was the same mean as in the entire sample) and, if anything, LPR (1.14) and SRP (1.18) voters were slightly more motivated by economic concerns than Euroskeptics generally.

<sup>18</sup> As a validation tests of these measures, we compared the means of Euroskeptics as a whole (the total row from Table 5) with the mean for the Euroenthusiasts (0-4 on the EU position scale). Across all 15 variables, the mean Euroskeptic position was indeed always further in the Euroskeptic directions (e.g., less trusting of the EU) than the mean position of Euroenthusiasts. In most cases, this difference was quite substantial, sometimes even as high as

results of Table 4, when comparing LPR and SRP, it is more often the case, although not exclusively so, that LPR supporters have more extreme anti-EU positions of the two.

Of course, one of the advantage of using 16 indicators as opposed to one is that we can tell a more nuanced story. There is some evidence to support the idea that SRP Euroskeptics did appear to more “pragmatic” than LPR Euroskeptics. SRP Euroskeptics were distinguished from other Euroskeptics based on their belief about whether their own material well being would be adversely affected by EU membership, and they were particularly skeptical about Poland’s ability to influence EU decision making and the level of corruption and incompetence among EU bureaucrats. They did not, on the other hand, seem to feel any less “European” than other Euroskeptics, nor did they have any less trust in NATO than other Euroskeptics (which could illustrate a more fundamental distrust of the West). So it is possible to see the foundations of an electorate that might be more attracted to claims that incompetence on the part of the Polish government and intransigence on the part of Polish bureaucrats had combined to produce a raw deal for Poland, as opposed to more fundamental belief that European project itself was “evil”.

Turning to the LPR, perhaps the best evidence to support the argument that LPR Euroskeptics were more fundamentally anti-Europe can be found in the fact that they consistently have the most negative opinions of the EU, especially in questions that ask for the most broad-based evaluation of the EU. This includes the 0-10 scale reported above in Table 4, but also the evaluation of whether EU membership is good or bad for Poland and the extent to which the EU is distrusted. LPR Euroskeptics also had the least European-based identity of any of the Euroskeptics, and they were significantly less trusting of NATO, an organization towards

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0.5 on a one point scale. The most notable exceptions concerned the degree to which respondents thought EU membership would help foreign firms in Poland – pretty much everyone thought that it would – and the extent to which Poland could influence NATO decision making. Results are available from the authors upon request (or See Appendix I).

which even the average Euroskeptic had a generally positive view.<sup>19</sup> It is also interesting to note that it is SRP Euroskeptics, and not LPR Euroskeptics, that are most concerned about the impact of EU membership on their personal financial situation, although this is clearly a matter of degree, as both groups lean strongly towards believing that their personal financial situation will be adversely affected by EU membership.

A final way to cut into the question of whether SRP and LPR attracted different types of Euroskeptics is to examine their prior political behavior. In Table 6 (below), we break down our four categories of Euroskeptics by their 1997 vote choice.<sup>20</sup>

-- INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE --

Three findings are apparent from Table 6. First, LPR Euroskeptics overwhelmingly came from voters for AWS in 1997. Second, SRP picked up the majority of its Euroskeptics from Polish Peasant Party (PSL), the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), and the Union of Labor (UP). This leads to a very clear observation: LPR was picking up Euroskeptics with a history of right-wing political behavior, while SRP was picking up Euroskeptics with a history of left-wing political behavior. To return to our theme of representation, one could argue that the presence of both a left-wing and right-wing Euroskeptic party may have afforded Polish Euroskeptics even more of an opportunity to vote for a party in 2001 that shared their position on the EU, without having to move too far along the political spectrum to do so. While these patterns mimic the movement of voters across parties between 1997 and 2001 from the electorate as a whole, the patterns were more extreme among Euroskeptics. For example, LPR picked up approximately 12% of the overall 1997 AWS electorate in 2001, but almost 20% of the Euroskeptic 1997 AWS

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<sup>19</sup> Although it should be noted that LPR Euroskeptics shared the views of all Poles that NATO membership was good for Poland.

<sup>20</sup> Readers should note that the 2001 Polish NES study is not a panel study, and thus when we refer to 1997 vote choice we are relying on a question asked in 2001 of respondents' recall of their vote choices in 1997.

electorate. Similarly, SRP picked up 3%, 5%, and 19% of the 1997 SLD, UP, and PSL electorates overall, respectively, but 6%, 13%, and 24% of their Euroskeptical 1997 electorates.

As demonstrated in Table 7 (below), we come to a similar conclusion when we observe the self-placement of Euroskeptics on a traditional left (0) – right (10) scale. LPR Euroskeptics are overwhelming more rightist than the average Euroskeptical, and SRP Euroskeptics are significantly more leftist than the average Euroskeptical. There is also little distinction between Euroenthusiasts and Euroskeptics as a whole, with the average Euroskeptical (4.8) only marginally more rightist than the average Euroenthusiast (4.7). This again points to the importance of both a left and right wing Euroskeptical option for the electorate, as Euroskepticism does not appear by itself to inherently be an issue of the left or right.<sup>21</sup>

-- INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE --

Finally, it is important to note what apparently did not happen in 2001: the attraction of Euroskeptics to SRP and LPR does not appear to be a story of mobilizing the formally unmobilized “silent majority”. With the appropriate caveats regarding the use of a recall vote question, it is clear that LPR was drawing the vast majority of its support among Euroskeptics from those who were already participating in the political process in 1997.<sup>22</sup> While SRP did receive a more substantial proportion (22%) of its Euroskeptical electorate from 1997 Euroskeptical non-voters, this represented a very small proportion of the 1997 Euroskeptical non-voting population (<7%). Indeed, over three-quarters of Euroskeptical non-voters in 1997 remained non-voters in 2001. This is practically the identical proportion of 1997 non-voters overall that

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<sup>21</sup> In fact, in 1997, the average Euroenthusiast was actually farther to the right (5.69) than the average Euroskeptical (5.13)

<sup>22</sup> It should be noted, though, that roughly one-quarter of our Euroskeptics could not recall or refused to say for whom they voted in 1997 – approximately 7.5% were ineligible to vote in 1997 – so the results in this paragraph should be seen through this lens. In particular, if a significant proportion of people who refuse to say for whom they voted because they were ashamed of the fact that they did not vote then we are likely underestimating the extent to which LPR and SRP may have succeeded in mobilizing non-voters.



remained non-voters in 2001, suggesting that Euroskepticism did not play an important role in drawing voters into the political process.

Overall, then, we can conclude the following. The emergence of Euroskeptic parties in the 2001 election provided an opportunity for a Polish Euroskeptic voter to support a party that would represent him or her on the issue of EU membership. While certainly not all Polish Euroskeptics chose to swallow the rest of the baggage that went along with voting for the LPR or SRP, voters for these two parties were consistently more Euroskeptic than Euroskeptics who opted to vote for the pro or neutral EU parties or sat out the election altogether. Moreover, these two parties presented a choice for Polish Euroskeptics: those who had voted for the right and had a stronger sense of antipathy toward EU membership were more likely to end up supporting LPR, while those who had voted for the left and were perhaps more “pragmatic” about their opposition to the EU were more likely to end up supporting SRP. Taken together, we can offer this as a sign that Polish representative democracy in 2001 was indeed responsive, and thus was fulfilling one of Achen’s goal of “popular sovereignty” in a liberal democracy.

### **Effects of Political Representation**

We now turn now turn to the final empirical question of the paper. Does representation along the dimension of EU membership have any effect on how Polish citizens view politics and political parties, and, if so, how strong is it relative to other issue areas? As mentioned in the introduction, we consider both *diffuse* and *specific* effects of representation. To measure the *diffuse* effect of representation, we analyze Poles’ satisfaction with the way democracy works in Poland on 1 (very satisfied) to 4 (not very satisfied) scale. To measure the *specific* effects of representation, we assess the effect of representation on both choice amongst parties and the

intensity of feelings about parties, the latter on a series of 0 (dislikes) to 10 (likes) scales. In all cases, the effect of representation on the issue of EU membership is compared to representation across three other important issue areas: religion, tax, and privatization. These three issue areas were chosen in response to previous research on Polish politics suggesting two primary axis of differentiation: an economic one (reform vs. non-reform, or more generally liberal pro-market vs. populist redistribution) and a socio-cultural one (secular cosmopolitanism vs. a more fundamental religious Polish nationalism) (Markowski 1997, Jasiewicz 1999, Kitschelt et al. 1999). Tax policy and privatization clearly tap into the first of these dimensions and religion into the second; for exact question wording, see Appendix I.

To measure political representation at the individual level, we rely on the technique of proximity scores.<sup>23</sup> We use a simple measure of proximity whereby the proximity score is a calculation of the distance between one's own view on a position and the stance of whatever institution is doing the representing on that issue. Here we are interested in the representation provided by political parties, so we focus on the distance between one's own view and the position of one's party.<sup>24</sup> To identify one's party, we rely on the following rules. For respondent's who reported voting in the 2001 election, we use the party for which they voted. For non-voters, we look first to whether they identify a party to which they feel close or closer to than other political parties. For non-voters who do not identify such a party, we use the party that they ranked highest on a 0-10 "likes vs. dislikes" scale.

We then calculate two different types of proximity scores. For a "para-objective" measure of where the party stands, we use the average response of the members of parliament of

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<sup>23</sup> For other work using different variations of proximity measure to study political representation, see Achen 1978, 1978; Budge and Farlie 1983; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989, and Kitschelt et al. 1999.

<sup>24</sup> Alternatively, for example, one could look at the degree of representation provided by the government or the parliament as a whole.

that party on the issue areas (e.g., the position for LPR on EU membership is taken to be the mean score given by LPR members of parliament on the EU issue area). Thus our para-objective proximity score is an attempt to assess how far a respondent is on a given issue from where the party's representatives in the parliament actually stand on that issue. While normative justifications of representative democracy are most concerned with objective representation, it may be the case that citizens are as influenced – or even more influenced – by the degree of subjective representation that they actually perceive. Thus we calculate a second “subjective” proximity score, which measures the distance between a voter's position on an issue area and that voter's belief of where her party stands on that issue, (e.g., the distance between an LPR voter's position on EU membership and her belief as to where LPR stands on the position of EU membership). Table 8 shows both types of proximity scores by issue area, by voters and non-voters, and by party preference of both voters and non-voters. For comparison, we also include objective proximity scores from 1997.<sup>25</sup>

-- INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE --

Four interesting observations can be made on the basis of this table. First, the EU issue area does not look radically different from the other three issue areas in terms of proximity scores, although in general it has the largest proximity scores. This is most evident in terms of objective proximity scores in 2001, where voters are farther from their party in the EU issue area than the other three issue areas, and indeed are almost a full point farther than in the area of religion. A similar pattern can be found in terms of subjective proximity scores, although the gap with the other issue areas is not quite as large. And in 1997, tax policy actually had the

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<sup>25</sup> Respondents were not asked to place parties on the EU issue area in the 1997 survey, so we can not calculate subjective scores for 1997.

largest proximity scores, while EU had the second.<sup>26</sup> Supporters thus seem willing to vote for parties that are a little farther from their position on EU membership from their party than on other issue areas (and especially religion), but not a significantly larger amount more.

Second, objective proximity scores increased in the EU issue area between 1997 and 2001. In some ways, this should not be surprising, given the overall increased variation in attitudes towards EU membership from 1997-2001. Still, it is worth noting that this pattern was not consistent across all of the issue areas. Average proximity scores for tax (a more salient issue than EU membership) and religion (a less salient issue than EU membership), in contrast, dropped from 1997 to 2001.

Third, most of the subjective proximity scores are lower than their commensurate objective proximity scores. Thus citizens in 2001 thought that they were closer to the position of their party on the issue of EU membership than the average position of the members of parliament would actually suggest. Moreover, this is generally an across the board phenomenon. It is only when we disaggregate to the level of particular party supporters on particular issues (e.g., non-voters who preferred the PSL actually were closer to the PSL on the EU issue area than they thought they were) do we find smaller subjective than objective proximity scores. While this is a very interesting finding that certainly deserves more attention in the future, for now we merely note the similarity of the EU issue area to the other three in this regard and the overall pattern of smaller subjective proximity scores across the same issue.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Recall that the EU question in 1997 was bundled with NATO membership as well; see note 11 for details.

<sup>27</sup> One other point worth noting is that although we disaggregate proximity scores by the party preferences of both voters and non-voters in Table 8, there is no particularly interesting pattern for proximity scores on the EU issue area in 2001 by these subgroups. It is worth noting that in both the subjective and objective categories the LPR, the most extreme Euroskeptic party, does have the lowest proximity score of all six parties, but this distinction is nothing compared to, for example, religion, where voters for the SLD have an average objective proximity score of 1.6 as opposed to voters for PiS, who have an average proximity score of 4.9. Perhaps the one interesting finding from within the EU issue area, however, is the sharp distinction between LPR voters and non-voters in terms of objective proximity scores, with the latter having an average score of 5.2 and the former 3.1. With the important

With these differences in mind, we begin our assessment of the diffuse effects of representation on the EU issue area by assessing whether Poles who are closer to their preferred party on the issue of EU membership are more satisfied with democracy than those who are farther away from their party on this issue. As a first cut, Table 9 calculates the mean satisfaction with democracy score for four categories of respondents on the basis of their proximity to their own party on the issue area at the head of column (1 = High Satisfaction, 4 = Low Satisfaction).

-- INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE --

Two observations are immediately apparent from examining the objective proximity scores. First, respondents that are the most proximate to their party on EU membership are the most satisfied with democracy of any issue area. Second, dissatisfaction with democracy increases in an almost linear fashion – exactly as predicted in the previous paragraph – as respondents are less and less represented by their party on the issue of EU membership. Somewhat surprisingly, this is not the case for either tax, religion, or privatization.<sup>28</sup> Even more strikingly, these findings hold if we move beyond the four issues contained in Table 9 to the entire range of ten issues on which Poles were asked their opinions: those closest to their party in terms of EU membership were the most satisfied with democracy of any issue area, and no other

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caveat that the number of LPR non-voters that expressed an opinion on EU membership is a fairly small group (under 25 respondents), this finding suggests the possibility that people who preferred LPR because of their stance on tax and privatization may have held off from voting for them because of divergent positions on the EU (and religion); this observation also holds using the subjective scores, although the divergences are not as large.

<sup>28</sup> Among the sub-category of voters, the effects are even more dramatic. Those who are most proximate to their party on the EU issue area have an average satisfaction with democracy of 2.80; no other category for any issue area is less than 3.0. And the difference in satisfaction between the most proximate EU voters (2.80) and the least proximate EU voters (3.44) is an even more substantively significant than across the sample as a whole.

issue area has a clear linear relationship between proximity and average satisfaction with democracy.<sup>29</sup>

The findings are not as stark in terms of subjective proximity, although they are largely as expected. There is still basically a linear relationship in the correct direction between being subjectively close to one's party on the issue of EU membership and being satisfied with the state of democracy in Poland, although the magnitude of this effect is much smaller. Those most proximate to their party had an average satisfaction with democracy of 2.69; those least proximate an average of 2.78. And those most proximate on EU membership are no longer the most satisfied of any category (e.g., the most proximate in terms of religion and, somewhat strangely, those in the third category on privatization are more satisfied with democracy) but it remains one of the most satisfied groups.

Of course, breaking down parties into any set of categories to compare mean satisfaction with democracy is always going to be a somewhat arbitrary process dependent on the delineation of the categories. For this reason, we also use regression analysis to assess this same question in Table 10. In both regressions, the dependent variable is the respondent's satisfaction with democracy, and the independent variables are the objective (subjective) proximity scores from their preferred party by issue area. The results of these regressions largely confirm the findings from Table 9. In terms of objective proximity to one's party, being close on the issue of EU membership is clearly the most important of the four issue in terms of having an effect on satisfaction with democracy. While the magnitude of this effect should not be overstated, the effect is in the correctly predicted direction and it is statistically significant.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, it has

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<sup>29</sup> The other six issues are crime, unemployment, agricultural subsidies, social welfare, foreign direction investment, and how to handle old communist nomenklatura. Results are available from the authors upon request.

<sup>30</sup> All else being equal, moving from a proximity score of 0 on the EU issue area (in other words, being in complete agreement with one's party on the issue of EU membership) to a proximity score of 5 (in other words., being 5

the largest effect of the four issue areas, and is one of only two in the correctly predicted direction.

-- INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE --

Similar to the Table 9, the coefficients on the subjective proximity scores in Table 10 also reveal the correctly predicted effect, but the effect is not as strong and we can no longer conclude that attitudes towards EU membership is the most important dimension of representation. Instead, proximity in terms of attitudes towards religion appears to be equally important, although neither coefficient is particularly large relative to its own standard error. Nevertheless, there does appear to be significant evidence that both objectively and subjectively representation on the issue area of EU membership is related to a respondent's overall level of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Poland.

So if representation on the issue of EU membership has some of the expected effects on diffuse satisfaction with politics, can we say the same for more specific political effects? In Table 11, we compare the effect of representation on party preferences across our four issue areas.<sup>31</sup> Recall that party preference is defined as the vote choice of voters, and either the most liked or most close party of non-voters. Each model has a dichotomous dependent variable: whether or not the respondent's preferred party is the party at the top of column. The independent variables are the proximity scores between the respondent's position on that issue and the position of the party of the model.<sup>32</sup> As the dependent variables are dichotomous, the model is estimated using binomial logit analysis.<sup>33</sup> As larger proximity scores represent less

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points away from one's party on an 11 point scale on the issue of EU membership) would result in a .17 predicted decrease in satisfaction with democracy on a 1-4 scale.

<sup>31</sup> The results are very similar if the analysis is limited to just voters and the dependent variable is vote choice.

<sup>32</sup> So for example, in the first column, the dependent variable is a 1 if the respondent's preferred party is the SLD, and a 0 if it is another party; the independent variables are then each respondents' proximity to the SLD on each of the issue areas.. Respondents whose preferred party could not be ascertained are omitted from the analysis.

<sup>33</sup> We do not employ multinomial logit analysis because the independent variables differ across the six models.

political representation on a given issue, we expect to find coefficients with negative signs, signifying that closer proximity to a party increases the likelihood that respondents will prefer that party.

-- INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE --

Again, we find a clear pattern of the importance of objective representation on the issue of EU membership. For four of the six parties, we are confident that closer proximity to the party on the issue of EU membership makes the respondent more likely to prefer that party. Not surprisingly, this includes the two Euroskeptical parties, SRP and LPR, as well as the two most Euroenthusiastic parties, the PO and SLD. Moreover, the effect is seen on a larger number of parties than any of the other three issue areas; indeed, only religion is in the correct direction for two of the political parties.<sup>34</sup>

The results in terms of subjective proximity, however, present a somewhat different picture. While the coefficients on the EU issue area are in the correctly predicted direction for five out of the six parties, the standard errors are large enough that we are really only confident that we have found the expected effect in the model predicting support for the SRP. By comparison, subjective representation on the issues of tax and religion appears to be much more consistently important in predicting one's preferred party.

Interestingly, this leaves us with a similar finding to when we tested the diffuse effects of representation regarding EU membership. Objective representation in the issue of EU membership appears to be important to Poles in terms of both satisfaction with democracy and in choosing between political parties; moreover, it is more consistently important than the other issue areas. Subjectively, however, thinking that one is close to a party on the issue of EU

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<sup>34</sup> Although it should be noted that the magnitude of the effect of variation in proximity on religion in the two cases where it is statistically significant in the correct direction is significantly larger than any of the effects for representation on the issue of EU membership.



membership appears to be less important, and especially in comparison to issues of taxation and religion.

As a final test, we examine the effect of political representation on the intensity of feelings Poles hold about political parties. In Table 12, columns 2-7 are roughly similar to Table 11, in so far as the independent variables measure proximity to the party at the head of the column, although the dependent variable now measures how much the respondent likes the party in question on a 0-10 score. The first column, however, is set up similar to Table 10: the dependent variable is how much the respondent likes her own party, and the independent variables measure proximity to that preferred party on each of the issues

-- INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE --

The clearest result from Table 12 is that none of the variables in column 1 of either the objective or subjective analyses are statistically significant. Put another way, we have no confidence that greater proximity to one's preferred party on any of these issues makes people like their party more intensely. This is in stark contrast to columns 2-7, which reveal numerous examples of cases where being more proximate to any given party makes the respondent like that party more. This is of course a much lower threshold, as it essentially reveals that people who are closer to, for example, PO on the issue of EU membership like PO more than people who are farther from PO on the issue of EU membership. So we can say that while proximity on issue areas increases the likelihood that a respondent will both like a party and prefer that party to all others, it does not differentiate how much the party is liked among its supporters.

Looking across the issue areas, we find that the EU issue area looks similar to the other three in terms of objective proximity, with likes/dislikes scores for three of the six parties being a function of proximity in the correctly predicted direction at a statistically significant level; as in

previous cases, this includes both of the Euroskeptic parties.<sup>35</sup> The other three issue areas reveal similar results, although again the magnitude of the effects for religion – when statistically significant – are by far the largest. In contrast to the previous analyses, there is little difference between subjective and objective proximity in terms of the issue area – in both analyses, SRP, PO, and LPR are all more liked among those more proximate on the issue.

Taken together, we can make the following conclusions regarding the effects of political representation on the issue of EU membership. First, representation on the EU issue area clearly has both diffuse and specific effects on how Poles viewed politics. Second, the representation on this issue has just as much of an effect, and in many cases apparently more an effect, as representation on such key issues as tax policy, privatization policy, and the degree to which the church should be involved with politics. Finally, objective representation on the issue of EU membership is more closely related to both satisfaction with democracy and party preferences than is subjective representation on the issue of EU membership. We take up the implications of these findings, as well as those from the previous sections of the paper, in the final concluding section.

## **Discussion**

In this paper we have analyzed presumably the most unstable, unconsolidated (inchoate) party system of East Central Europe. It has in part been unstable because of recurring changes to its institutional design, especially in terms of electoral rules, which have changed between almost every set of parliamentary elections. Nor has stability on the part of political elites, who have left parties, split parties, and merged parties with surprising frequency, helped (Zielinski,

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<sup>35</sup> The substantive magnitude of these effects are modest but meaningful. A shift from a proximity score of 1-6, all else equal, would yield a decrease in the likes/dislikes score of between approximately 0.5 to 1.0 on a 0-10 scale.

Slomczynski, and Shabad 2004). The result has been very low confidence on the part of Poles in their political infrastructure. Barely half of the population cares about voting at national elections. Nevertheless in the 2001 elections we have witnessed a classical example of elite-level political responsiveness to the will of the people. Irrespectively how one evaluates the credentials of the politicians of the two radical-populist, euroskeptical parties – Samoobrona and LPR – the representativeness of the Polish parliament and the political system has benefited from the emergence of these two new political actors, especially in terms of the EU issue area. The simple relationship between political representation and quality of democracy in principle seems obvious – the more of the former the better for the latter. There are however exceptions and we may be witnessing one, because the long-term consequences of the boosting of this kind of populist representation is fairly obvious – the Polish political system has radicalized during the last four years. As a result, moderate parties have started competing for radical voters, overbidding in promises and polarizing the scene. Consequently, moderate willingness for cooperation and consensus-seeking attitudes among the elites have evaporated in the 2001-2005 parliament. This development can hardly be indicative of improving the quality of democracy. And one can only wonder if this trade-off between the quality of democracy and the quality of representation will be an ever more frequent concern as democratic elections spread further around the globe.

The findings of the paper tell us that even in such an inchoate party system, certain basic mechanisms nonetheless work: the signaling game between masses and elites seems to be efficient; individuals correctly identify parties' policy stances; and even the intensity of attitudes seems to be logically related to party support (the radically euroskeptical voters being overrepresented among the euroskeptical parties' followers). Additionally, the salience of the

issues is reasonably (plausibly) linked to individuals' positive attitudes towards the EU (and other) issue(s). Despite the fact that the issue of EU membership may have been less salient for the masses than elites, it nevertheless ultimately mattered significantly in individuals' electoral choices, and party preferences.

Polish euroskepticism of the turn of the century did not however, as many tend to believe in Poland, mobilize the apathetic part of society. Those who voted for the two euroskeptic parties were already engaged in electoral politics earlier. It is important also to note that there are different euroskepticisms (plural) in Poland: the more fundamental one, which predominantly was attracted by the LPR platform; and the more pragmatic one that went to support this SRP. This distinction is visible both at the attitudinal level of what supporters of these two parties preferences are and from where they were "recruited" in the 2001 election.

Finally, we see how important social dynamics are as compared to static snap shots of political life. Even if proximity – the closeness of individuals to their likely representatives on certain issues at some point in time – is not impressive it can quickly change. This is because the fundamental electoral mechanism is at work, the will to be (re-) elected, makes politicians responsive to voters preferences. And despite the inherent instability of the Polish political scene in the late 1990s, we've clearly registered these fundamental mechanisms at work it in our analyses of the EU issue area in the Polish case.

## Appendix I: Wording of Issue Position Questions in 2001 PGSW

**P 54.** A variety of solutions and policies aimed at solving the above mentioned issues are conceivable. On subsequent CARDS we present opposite solutions to each issue. Please read them carefully and tell me, where would you place your own opinions and stances. In doing so, please use the 11-point scale, where:

**0 --** means full acceptance of the statement (solution) proposed on the left side of the CARD,

**10 --** means full acceptance of the statement (solution) -- on the right side,

**5 --** means that you favor solutions lying in between both opposite ones, and the remaining scale points indicate different levels of acceptance of each of those opposite statements.

*(INTERVIEWER: Subsequently show CARDS 10 A through 10 J; At each point in time the respondent should have only one card. Please code answers according to the scale)*

0 \_\_\_\_\_ 1 \_\_\_\_\_ 2 \_\_\_\_\_ 3 \_\_\_\_\_ 4 \_\_\_\_\_ 5 \_\_\_\_\_ 6 \_\_\_\_\_ 7 \_\_\_\_\_ 8 \_\_\_\_\_ 9 \_\_\_\_\_ 10

A/

00) Crime policies should be „tough” even if they restrict basic freedoms of average citizens

10) Crime ought to be fought against, but the policies should not restrict basic freedoms of average citizens

97) DK

B/

00) State owned enterprises should be privatized quickly; the inefficient ones should be liquidated

10) Enterprises should remain state property and their modernization financed from the state budget

97) DK

C/

00) The Church should be completely separated from the state and should not interfere with politics

10) The Church should exert influence over politics and state policies

97) DK

D/

00) Individuals occupying high positions under communism (‘nomenclatura’) should now be forbidden to perform responsible state functions

10) These individuals (‘nomenclatura’) should have the same rights as all others in competing for public offices and state positions

97) DK

E/

00) Fighting unemployment should be an absolute policy priority of the government, even if it leads to higher spending and inflation

10) Many other - more important than unemployment - issues should be governmental priority, i.e. balanced budget, fighting inflation, etc.

97) DK

F/

00) The higher one’s income, the higher the percentage at which it should be taxed

10) Everyone should be taxed the same percentage of his/her income, irrespective of the income level

97) DK

G/

00) Our foreign policy should pursue joining the EU as soon as possible

10) Polish foreign policy should not pursue joining the EU, and should instead protect our political and economic sovereignty

97) DK

H/

00) Agriculture should receive subsidies from the budget, otherwise many farms will go bankrupt

10) Agriculture should not receive subsidies from the budget, because no single social group should live at the expense of society

97) DK

I/

00) The state should grant its citizens the widest possible social safety net, i.e. free health care, social welfare, education, etc.

10) Citizens should take their own responsibility for their healthcare, children's education, etc

97) DK

J/

00) It should not matter whether capital is Polish or foreign, as long as it boosts investment, production and creates new employment opportunities

10) Inflows of foreign capital should be deliberately limited as it makes the Polish economy dependent upon foreigners

97) DK

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**Table 1: Predictors of EU Salience: Voters vs. Non-Voters**

**A.2001**

	<b>Mean</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>SD</b>
<b>Non-Voters</b>	<b>5.79</b>	674.5	2.89
<b>Voters</b>	<b>6.09</b>	987.4	2.94
<b>Total</b>	<b>5.96</b>	1662	2.92
<b>F</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Eta</b>	<b>Eta2</b>
	4.155	<b>0.042</b>	0.050 0.2%

**B.1997**

	<b>Mean</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>SD</b>
<b>Non-Voters</b>	<b>7.07</b>	765	2.72
<b>Voters</b>	<b>7.28</b>	1050	2.46
<b>Total</b>	<b>7.19</b>	1815	2.58
<b>F</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Eta</b>	<b>Eta2</b>
	3.065	<b>0.080</b>	0.041 0.2%

**Table 2: Predictors of EU Salience: By Vote Choice**

**A.2001**

Vote Choice	Mean	N	SD
<b>SLD</b>	<b>6.22</b>	407	2.85
<b>AWSP</b>	<b>6.23</b>	34	2.98
<b>UW</b>	<b>7.60</b>	20	2.65
<b>SRP</b>	<b>5.39</b>	109	2.93
<b>PiS</b>	<b>6.07</b>	92	2.96
<b>PSL</b>	<b>5.20</b>	81	2.88
<b>PO</b>	<b>7.13</b>	132	2.65
<b>LPR</b>	<b>4.96</b>	65	3.06
<b>Total</b>	<b>6.09</b>	941	2.92
<b>F</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Eta</b>	<b>Eta2</b>
6.929	<b>0.000</b>	0.222	4.9%

**B.1997**

Vote Choice	Mean	N	SD
<b>UP</b>	<b>7.32</b>	40	2.68
<b>N-Ch-D BdP</b>	<b>5.48</b>	11	1.86
<b>KPEiR RP</b>	<b>8.94</b>	8	2.42
<b>UW</b>	<b>7.79</b>	152	2.32
<b>AWS</b>	<b>7.30</b>	393	2.49
<b>SLD</b>	<b>7.27</b>	256	2.40
<b>PSL</b>	<b>6.72</b>	67	2.51
<b>UPR</b>	<b>6.49</b>	12	1.97
<b>ROP</b>	<b>7.41</b>	51	2.49
<b>KPEiR</b>	<b>6.85</b>	23	2.56
<b>Total</b>	<b>7.30</b>	1014	2.46
<b>F</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Eta</b>	<b>Eta2</b>
2.436	<b>0.010</b>	0.146	2.1%

**Table 3. Correlation of Salience and Position by 10 Issue Areas**

Panel A. 2001

	<b>EU</b>	<b>Crime</b>	<b>Priv.</b>	<b>Rel.</b>	<b>Nom.</b>	<b>Unem.</b>	<b>Tax</b>	<b>Agr.</b>	<b>Soc.</b>	<b>Frc</b>
<b>Corr.</b>	<b>-0.459</b>	<b>-0.117</b>	<b>-0.185</b>	<b>0.238</b>	<b>-0.269</b>	<b>-0.159</b>	<b>0.009</b>	<b>-0.158</b>	<b>-0.171</b>	<b>-0.159</b>
<b>Sig.</b>	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.704	0.000	0.000	0.000
<b>N</b>	1565	1775	1593	1684	1504	1760	1666	1641	1695	1548

Panel B. 1997

	<b>EU</b>	<b>Crime</b>	<b>Priv.</b>	<b>Rel.</b>	<b>Nom.</b>	<b>Unem.</b>	<b>Tax</b>	<b>Agr.</b>	<b>Soc.</b>	<b>Frc</b>
<b>Corr.</b>	<b>-0.405</b>	<b>-0.032</b>	<b>-0.400</b>	<b>0.272</b>	<b>-0.388</b>	<b>-0.277</b>	<b>-0.053</b>	<b>-0.496</b>	<b>-0.235</b>	<b>-0.109</b>
<b>Sig.</b>	0.000	0.161	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.022	0.000	0.000	0.000
<b>N</b>	1698	1919	1704	1856	1704	1904	1850	1766	1872	1647

*Note: Nom = attitudes towards former nomenklatura; Frc = attitudes towards foreign capital.*

**Table 4. Attitudes towards EU membership by Non-Voters, Voters for Euroskeptical Parties, and Voters for Other Parties**

Panel 1. Average EU Position Score by Vote Choice: Full Electorate

Vote Choice	Mean	Std. Err.
Non-Voter	5.18	.143
Other Party	4.76	.140
SRP	6.11	.317
LPR	6.84	.463

*N=1571, NV = non voter, SRP = Self Defense for Republic of Poland, LPR = League of Polish Families, Other = voted for any other party. Means weighted by sample weights.*

Panel 2. Average EU Position Score by Vote Choice: Euroskeptics

Vote	Mean	Std. Err.
Non-Voter	8.54	.10
Other Party	8.64	.09
SRP	8.94	.20
LPR	9.28	.22

*N=608, Euroskeptics = 6-10 on EU position score. NV = non voter, SRP = Self Defense for Republic of Poland, LPR = League of Polish Families, Other = voted for any other party. Means weighted by sample weights.*

Panel 3: Proportion of Hard Core (9-10) Euroskeptics by Vote Choice

	Skeptic Instensity		Total
	weak(6-8)	str(9-10)	
NV	106	144	250
	42.40	57.60	100.00
Other	118	152	270
	43.70	56.30	100.00
SRP	18	35	53
	33.96	66.04	100.00
LPR	7	28	35
	20.00	80.00	100.00
Total	249	359	608
	40.95	59.05	100.00

Pearson chi2(3) = 8.4868 Pr = 0.037

NV = non voter, SRP = Self Defense for Republic of Poland, LPR = League of Polish Families, Other = voted for any other party

**Table 5: Euroskeptc Positions on EU Related Issues by Vote Choice**

		Changes in Borders: Good (1) vs. Bad (2)	Polish owned private industry helped (1) or hurt (2) by EU memb.	Are EU politicians are honest and efficient (1) or corrupt\inefficient (2)	Trust in EU a lot (1) - a little (4)	Poland can affect NATO a lot (1) to not much at all (4)	On the whole, the EU is good (1) or bad (2) for Poland	Poland can affect EU a lot (1) to not much at all (4)	Identity: all Polish (1) - mostly European (5)	Polish agriculture will be helped (1) or hurt (2) by EU membership	Trust in NATO: a lot (1) - a little (4)	Your family's standard of living helped (1) or hurt (2) by EU memb.	State owned industries helped (1) or hurt (2) by EU membership	Foreign industry helped (1) or hurt (2) by EU membership	On the whole, NATO is good (1) or bad (2) for Poland	People from other countries working in Poland is Better (1) or Worse (2)	Vote because of Economy (1) vs Politics and Culture (2)
<b>NV</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>1.45</b>	<b>1.66</b>	<b>1.47</b>	<b>2.79</b>	<b>2.90</b>	<b>1.59</b>	<b>2.95</b>	<b>2.24</b>	<b>1.82</b>	<b>2.27</b>	<b>1.73</b>	<b>1.85</b>	<b>1.12</b>	<b>1.12</b>	<b>1.58</b>	<b>1.25</b>
	<b>N</b>	173	183	133	220	196	172	192	248	196	225	147	203	201	190	229	154
<b>Other</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>1.48</b>	<b>1.60</b>	<b>1.41</b>	<b>2.75</b>	<b>2.89</b>	<b>1.53</b>	<b>2.97</b>	<b>2.24</b>	<b>1.80</b>	<b>2.28</b>	<b>1.72</b>	<b>1.83</b>	<b>1.09</b>	<b>1.13</b>	<b>1.56</b>	<b>1.21</b>
	<b>N</b>	191	205	135	232	224	202	221	265	220	236	159	216	226	222	245	214
<b>SRP</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>1.71</b>	<b>1.85</b>	<b>1.66</b>	<b>3.07</b>	<b>3.03</b>	<b>1.77</b>	<b>3.30</b>	<b>2.36</b>	<b>1.80</b>	<b>2.24</b>	<b>1.88</b>	<b>1.88</b>	<b>1.17</b>	<b>1.19</b>	<b>1.59</b>	<b>1.18</b>
	<b>N</b>	34	40	32	40	39	37	38	51	46	40	36	43	45	39	47	39
<b>LPR</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>1.69</b>	<b>1.83</b>	<b>1.64</b>	<b>3.22</b>	<b>3.33</b>	<b>1.85</b>	<b>3.06</b>	<b>1.99</b>	<b>1.94</b>	<b>2.60</b>	<b>1.78</b>	<b>1.85</b>	<b>1.14</b>	<b>1.16</b>	<b>1.64</b>	<b>1.14</b>
	<b>N</b>	27	30	22	35	22	31	21	36	33	34	18	25	33	26	32	29
<b>Total</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>1.50</b>	<b>1.66</b>	<b>1.48</b>	<b>2.83</b>	<b>2.93</b>	<b>1.59</b>	<b>2.99</b>	<b>2.24</b>	<b>1.82</b>	<b>2.29</b>	<b>1.74</b>	<b>1.85</b>	<b>1.11</b>	<b>1.13</b>	<b>1.57</b>	<b>1.22</b>
	<b>N</b>	424	458	321	528	482	442	473	600	495	536	359	486	505	476	553	435
	<b>F</b>	4.06	4.68	3.01	5.03	2.88	5.98	2.20	0.71	1.27	2.08	1.34	0.26	1.06	0.52	0.43	0.85
	<b>Sig.</b>	0.007	0.003	0.031	0.002	0.036	0.001	0.087	0.546	0.285	0.102	0.262	0.852	0.367	0.667	0.730	0.468
	<b>Eta</b>	0.168	0.173	0.166	0.167	0.133	0.198	0.118	0.060	0.088	0.108	0.106	0.040	0.079	0.057	0.049	0.077
	<b>EtaSq</b>	2.8%	3.0%	2.8%	2.8%	1.8%	3.9%	1.4%	0.4%	0.8%	1.2%	1.1%	0.2%	0.6%	0.3%	0.2%	0.6%

**Table 6: 1997 Euroskeptical Vote Choice by 2001 Vote Choice**

2001 Vote		1997 Vote								
		NV	SLD	AWS	UW	SRP	PSL	ROP	UP	Total
<b>NV</b>	<b>N</b>	85	20	34	3	0	12	2	6	162
	<b>% Non-Voters 01</b>	52.5%	12.3%	21.0%	1.9%	0.0%	7.4%	1.2%	3.7%	100%
	<b>% Vote Choice 97</b>	77.3%	20.6%	29.1%	11.5%	0.0%	26.7%	40.0%	40.0%	38.9%
<b>Other</b>	<b>N</b>	18	70	57	19	0	21	0	7	192
	<b>% Other Parties 01</b>	9.4%	36.5%	29.7%	9.9%	0.0%	10.9%	0.0%	3.6%	100%
	<b>% Vote Choice 97</b>	16.4%	72.2%	48.7%	73.1%	0.0%	46.7%	0.0%	46.7%	46.2%
<b>SRP</b>	<b>N</b>	7	6	3	1	0	11	1	2	31
	<b>% SRP 01</b>	22.6%	19.4%	9.7%	3.2%	0.0%	35.5%	3.2%	6.5%	100%
	<b>% Vote Choice 97</b>	6.4%	6.2%	2.6%	3.8%	0.0%	24.4%	20.0%	13.3%	7.5%
<b>LPR</b>	<b>N</b>	0	1	23	3	1	1	2	0	31
	<b>% LPR 01</b>	0.0%	3.2%	74.2%	9.7%	3.2%	3.2%	6.5%	0.0%	100%
	<b>% Vote Choice 97</b>	0.0%	1.0%	19.7%	11.5%	100%	2.2%	40.0%	0.0%	7.5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>N</b>	110	97	117	26	1	45	5	15	416
	<b>% LPR 01</b>	26.4%	23.3%	28.1%	6.3%	0.2%	10.8%	1.2%	3.6%	100%
	<b>% Vote Choice 97</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

**Table 7. Average Left-Right Self-Placement of Euroskeptics by Vote Choice**

	<b>Mean</b>	<b>N</b>
Non-Voters	4,78	249
Other Parties	4,66	265
SRP	4,19	51
LPR	6,90	36
Total	4,81	600
	<b>F</b>	<b>Sig.</b>
	10,2	0,000



**Table 8: Proximity Scores**

		<b>2001</b>							
		<b>Objective</b>				<b>Subjective</b>			
		<b>EU</b>	<b>PRV</b>	<b>REL</b>	<b>TAX</b>	<b>EU</b>	<b>PRV</b>	<b>REL</b>	<b>TAX</b>
<b>Voters</b>	<b>SLD</b>	3.88	2.98	1.59	2.95	2.99	2.85	1.47	2.51
	<b>SRP</b>	3.30	2.39	2.43	2.52	2.64	2.81	3.04	2.29
	<b>PiS</b>	3.10	3.51	4.93	3.72	2.82	2.66	2.79	2.77
	<b>PSL</b>	3.31	3.08	2.73	2.61	3.08	2.73	3.28	1.86
	<b>PO</b>	3.27	4.09	2.85	5.61	2.70	3.09	2.30	3.40
	<b>LPR</b>	3.06	2.22	3.78	2.92	2.35	2.71	3.36	1.80
	<b>VOTED</b>	3.52	3.09	2.50	3.32	2.85	2.84	2.19	2.53
<b>Non Voters</b>	<b>SLD</b>	3.91	2.85	1.58	2.95	2.79	2.75	1.77	2.30
	<b>SRP</b>	3.35	2.20	2.20	2.63	3.51	2.20	2.89	2.64
	<b>PiS</b>	2.52	3.98	5.19	4.11	2.64	3.23	2.41	3.29
	<b>PSL</b>	3.00	3.30	3.10	2.32	3.35	2.79	3.22	2.64
	<b>PO</b>	4.09	4.40	2.49	6.13	3.07	3.84	2.44	3.43
	<b>LPR</b>	5.18	2.66	5.02	3.02	3.39	3.36	4.81	3.69
	<b>NV</b>	3.60	3.08	2.58	3.43	3.07	2.83	2.45	2.74
	<b>Total</b>	3.55	3.08	2.53	3.36	2.92	2.84	2.28	2.60

  

		<b>1997</b>			
		<b>Objective</b>			
		<b>EU</b>	<b>PRV</b>	<b>REL</b>	<b>TAX</b>
<b>Voters</b>	<b>UW</b>	2.91	3.05	2.10	4.30
	<b>AWS</b>	2.61	2.85	3.33	3.93
	<b>SLD</b>	2.55	2.49	1.34	2.99
	<b>PSL</b>	3.03	2.41	2.35	2.75
	<b>ROP</b>	6.44	2.52	3.77	3.86
	<b>VOTED</b>	2.91	2.73	2.54	3.64
<b>Non- Voters</b>	<b>UW</b>	2.62	3.57	2.12	4.04
	<b>AWS</b>	2.93	3.58	3.84	3.98
	<b>SLD</b>	3.03	2.55	1.57	2.90
	<b>PSL</b>	3.25	2.49	2.69	3.36
	<b>ROP</b>	5.74	2.22	2.07	3.05
	<b>NV</b>	3.13	3.12	2.73	3.60
<b>Total</b>	2.99	2.87	2.61	3.63	

**Table 9. Mean Satisfaction with Democracy by Issue Area Proximity to Preferred Party**  
(Number of Observations in Parentheses)

	<b>Objective Proximity Scores</b>			
	<b>EU</b>	<b>Privatization</b>	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Tax</b>
Most Proximate (<1)	2.57 (243)	2.64 (247)	2.74 (179)	2.63 (187)
>1 & < 2	2.69 (255)	2.73 (233)	2.76 (616)	2.77 (221)
>2 & < 3	2.75 (314)	2.70 (365)	2.72 (355)	2.79 (566)
Least Proximate (>4)	2.83 (490)	2.81 (469)	2.70 (212)	2.69 (371)
Total	2.74 (1302)	2.73 (1314)	2.74 (1361)	2.74 (1345)

	<b>Subjective Proximity Scores</b>			
	<b>EU</b>	<b>Privatization</b>	<b>Religion</b>	<b>Tax</b>
Most Proximate (<1)	2.69 (294)	2.72 (260)	2.62 (387)	2.69 (303)
= 1 , 2	2.71 (305)	2.73 (332)	2.79 (328)	2.75 (337)
= 3 , 4	2.74 (216)	2.63 (240)	2.80 (196)	2.69 (186)
Least Proximate (>4)	2.78 (316)	2.80 (291)	2.78 (232)	2.73 (278)
Total	2.73 (1132)	2.72 (1123)	2.73 (1143)	2.72 (1105)

**Table 10. Regression Analysis of Effect of Issue Proximity on Satisfaction with Democracy**

Issue Area Proximity	1 Objective Proximity	2 Subjective Proximity
EU	.045*** (.011)	.014 (.012)
Tax	-.011 (.012)	.014 (.012)
Religion	-.036* (.014)	.023 (.012)
Privatization	.007 (.014)	.008 (.012)
Constant	2.62*** (.073)	2.50*** (.063)
N	740	613

**Table 11. Logit Analysis of Effect of Issue Proximity on Party Preference**

## Panel 1. Objective Proximity Scores

Issue Area Proximity	SLD	SRP	PiS	PSL	PO	LPR
EU	-.047* (.021)	-.118*** (.031)	-.002 (.050)	.051 (.052)	-.086** (.030)	-.095* (.040)
Tax	-.045 (.032)	-.083* (.039)	-.016 (.053)	-.076 (.044)	-.048 (.025)	.093 (.071)
Religion	-.255*** (.035)	.022 (.032)	-.032 (.043)	-.103 (.079)	.046 (.060)	-.305*** (.044)
Privatization	-.007 (.030)	-.046 (.040)	-.070 (.047)	.122* (.060)	-.122*** (.034)	-.015 (.067)
Constant	.445** (.166)	-.945*** (.189)	-1.70 (.288)	-2.32*** (.296)	-.771** (.262)	-1.08** (.366)
N	1357	1357	1357	1357	1357	1357

\*\*\* p≤.001, \*\*p≤.01, \*p≤.05

Dependent variable in each column is whether or not party at top of column is respondent's preferred party; proximity score is distant of respondent from that party.

## Panel 2. Subjective Proximity Scores

Issue Area Proximity	SLD	SRP	PiS	PSL	PO	LPR
EU	-.022 (.022)	-.089** (.032)	-.005 (.044)	.024 (.042)	-.051 (.036)	-.095 (.055)
Tax	-.053* (.024)	-.068* (.034)	-.123** (.047)	-.164** (.052)	-.068* (.033)	-.086 (.057)
Religion	-.130*** (.027)	-.072* (.034)	-.100* (.047)	-.022 (.045)	-.201*** (.043)	-.174*** (.045)
Privatization	-.057* (.024)	-.028 (.035)	-.049 (.044)	.031 (.045)	-.091** (.035)	-.011 (.055)
Constant	.349** (.131)	-.764*** (.199)	-1.07*** (.245)	-1.90*** (.255)	-.402 (.224)	-1.07*** (.309)
N	1036	940	812	948	924	759

\*\*\* p≤.001, \*\*p≤.01, \*p≤.05

Dependent variable in each column is whether or not party at top of column is respondent's preferred party; proximity score is distant of respondent from that party.

**Table 12. Regression Analysis of Effect of Issue Proximity on Party Likes/Dislikes**

Panel 1. Objective Proximity Scores

Issue Area Proximity	1 Own Party	2 SLD	3 SRP	4 PiS	5 PSL	6 PO	7 LPR
EU	.031 (.032)	-.006 (.031)	-.191*** (.031)	.074 (.042)	.005 (.038)	-.106*** (.027)	-.098*** (.025)
Tax	-.050 (.036)	-.056 (.047)	-.133*** (.038)	-.035 (.046)	-.099*** (.029)	-.095*** (.025)	.055 (.049)
Religion	-.040 (.041)	-.360*** (.041)	.037 (.036)	-.195*** (.037)	-.068 (.056)	-.039 (.061)	-.381*** (.034)
Privatization	.021 (.041)	.006 (.045)	-.175*** (.038)	.020 (.040)	.074 (.042)	-.142*** (.034)	-.097* (.041)
Constant	7.81*** (.210)	6.12*** (.238)	5.38*** (.202)	5.34*** (.259)	4.40*** (.213)	5.50*** (.268)	6.25 (.291)
N	783	1368	1340	1255	1331	1274	1156

\*\*\* p≤.001, \*\*p≤.01, \*p≤.05

Panel 2. Subjective Proximity Scores

Issue Area Proximity	1 Own Party	2 SLD	3 SRP	4 PiS	5 PSL	6 PO	7 LPR
EU	.003 (.034)	-.009 (.033)	-.146*** (.033)	-.006 (.040)	-.056 (.031)	-.118*** (.032)	-.133*** (.038)
Tax	-.058 (.035)	-.129*** (.035)	-.178*** (.034)	-.083* (.039)	-.132*** (.033)	-.105*** (.031)	-.145*** (.040)
Religion	-.066 (.036)	-.263*** (.037)	-.007 (.036)	-.040 (.039)	-.016 (.033)	-.191*** (.036)	-.178*** (.034)
Privatization	-.030 (.035)	-.060 (.035)	-.085* (.037)	-.134*** (.038)	-.083* (.035)	-.128*** (.032)	-.079 (.042)
Constant	8.16*** (.180)	6.51*** (.193)	5.40*** (.221)	5.45*** (.235)	5.15*** (.190)	5.67*** (.228)	5.76*** (.265)
N	640	1049	942	794	958	912	709

\*\*\* p≤.001, \*\*p≤.01, \*p≤.05

For both panels: dependent variable is dislikes/likes (0-10) score for party at the head of the column in columns 2-7, and for the party that the respondent voted for in column 1. Proximity scores are relative to party at the head of the column in all columns 2-7 and analysis includes all respondents. Proximity scores are relative to the party the respondent voted for in column 1 and analysis includes only voters for these six parties